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House Price Volatility and the Housing Ladder
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This paper investigates the effects of housing price risk on housing choices over the life-
cycle. Housing price risk can be substantial but, unlike other risky assets which people can 
avoid, the fact that most people will eventually own their home creates an insurance demand 
for housing assets early in life. Our contribution is to focus on the importance of home 
ownership and housing wealth as a hedge against future house price risk for individuals 
moving up the ladder – people living in places with higher housing price risk should own their 
first home at a younger age, should live in larger homes, and should be less likely to 
refinance. These predictions are tested and shown to hold using panel data from the United 
States and Great Britain. 
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One of the most critical consumption and investment decisions that individuals and 
families make over their life-cycle involves the amount of housing services to consume 
and whether or not to combine consumption with ownership. Housing is an important 
component of consumption, but not simply because it absorbs a large fraction of the 
household budget—which it does. Where we live and how much we decide to spend on 
housing is a key ingredient to the amenities and life-style we have chosen for our families 
and ourselves. But housing, or more particularly housing wealth, can be even more 
critical as an investment as it is typically by far the biggest marketable asset in the 
household portfolio for most people.  
The contribution of this paper is to bring together two key determinants of 
housing consumption and home ownership decisions into an empirical model of housing 
outcomes. The first of these is the housing ladder. Rather than modeling home ownership 
as a one-time durable purchase, we model it as a series of purchase decisions, or a 
housing ladder, where the desired flow of housing services rises with family formation 
and growing family size over the life cycle. The second is the acknowledgement of the 
role of future house price risk. In some geographic markets, housing can be a risky asset 
with high levels of unpredictable price volatility while in other places the prospect of 
capital gains or losses in housing are understandably not the subject of much social 
conversation.  
Our contribution is to focus on the importance of ownership as a hedge against 
future house price risk as individuals move up the ladder. We use a stylized model to 
show that increasing house price risk acts as an incentive to become a home owner earlier 
in the life-cycle and, once an owner, to move more rapidly up the housing ladder.   3
Increases in volatility are shown to increase ownership and to increase the quantity of 
housing wealth conditional on ownership in earlier periods of the life-cycle. We then 
establish that these relationships hold empirically using panel data on families in different 
geographic markets in Britain and in the US.  
Housing needs change over the life-cycle and the decision of when to buy the first 
property and at what point to move up the ladder is a key life-cycle decision. For 
example, Ortalo-Magne and Rady (2004, 2006) note the importance of new entrants at 
the bottom of the ladder for the determination of housing transactions along the whole 
ladder. Ermisch and Pevalin (2004) document the importance of childbearing and family 
formation decisions on housing choices. We follow this lead by allowing the demand for 
housing consumption and movements up the ladder to depend directly on the 
demographic profile of the family. We then add to this the enhanced incentive to own and 
to move up the ladder created by more volatile house prices.  
The idea that home ownership can be seen as a hedge against uncertainty in the 
price of housing services has many precedents. For example, Sinai and Souleles (2005) 
use this observation to carefully show the increased demand for ownership when rental 
price uncertainty is higher. Our contribution instead is to focus on the importance of 
ownership and the quantity of housing owned as a hedge against future house price risk 
as individuals move up the ladder. We examine the impact of volatility on both 
ownership and on measures of the quantity of housing wealth conditional on ownership. 
Both are shown to rise with increased house price volatility. 
In contrast to other risky assets in which risk-averse individuals can simply 
choose to avoid them, everyone must consume housing, and the vast majority of people 
desire to and eventually do end up owning their own home. In addition, for most   4
individuals the demand for housing will rise over the life-cycle as family size increases. 
The combination of these factors results in an insurance role for housing wealth in early 
life that drives the predictions we investigate in our empirical analysis. 
Using panel data from the UK and the US, we test the implications of the ladder 
and price volatility on the decision on when to become a homeowner, how much housing 
to consume, and whether to refinance out of housing equity. In the presence of volatility 
in house prices, housing has three roles—investment, consumption, and insurance against 
price fluctuations for future movements up the housing ladder. A simple theoretical 
discussion illustrates these effects, and the predictions for home ownership, and housing 
wealth accumulation are drawn out.  
Because housing price volatility is spatially variable, we test the importance of the 
role of volatility in housing decisions empirically using comparable panel data from the 
US and the UK. There are significant differences in housing price variability between and 
within these two countries. But in addition there are also differences in the tax treatment 
of mortgage debt, the nature of mortgage arrangements, and even the level of geographic 
mobility of younger households. Consequently a test relying on between country 
differences is unlikely to isolate the effects of interest. In our analysis we show that, 
while the international differences are indeed in accordance with the predictions of our 
model, the model also performs well when estimated from within country variation in 
each of the countries we consider, despite their rather wide institutional differences. 
The analysis in this paper is in five sections. Section I documents a critical and 
salient fact—a steep housing ladder with age which is coincident with changing 
demographics over the life-cycle that are common across the two countries. Section II  
shows the large special dispersion in house price volatility within and between the UK   5
and US. Section III then discusses the implications of housing price variability for 
housing choices in a simple life-cycle framework. In Section IV the model predictions 
concerning the age of initial home ownership, the decision to refinance, and the shape of 
housing wealth and the number of rooms are put to the test.  In the final section we 
summarize our conclusions.  
I.  The Housing Ladder 
Even without credit constraints or income uncertainty, individuals would not choose to 
consume the same flow of housing services at all times in their lives. People may start by 
moving out of the parental home into a small rented or purchased apartment or flat of 
their own. When they marry, they may know that two may well live more cheaply than 
one but they generally do not want to live in smaller places and often may want to own a 
bigger but still modest first home. Children then appear on the scene and eventually will 
age into rooms of their own—all of which requires a bigger if not better home.  
A simple way of illustrating this point is to examine how the size of homes people 
live in changes with age. Table 1 shows the age profile of mean number of rooms of 
household heads for owners and renters alike in the US and UK using the Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics (PSID) in the US and the British Household Panel Study (BHPS).
1  
Note that the number of rooms in the British data excludes kitchens and bathrooms and so 
the number of rooms is not strictly comparable across the two countries.  In both 
countries there is a strong increase in size of house as the head of household grows older, 
flattening out around the age 40 but rising steeply from the 20s to the 30s. The general 
shape of the ladder is similar in the two countries.
2 It is important to note that the steep 
part of the ladder is not simply the consequence of changing tenure status from renter to   6
owner. While owned homes are always larger than rented ones on average, the steep early 
ladder characterizes both rented and owned properties.
3   
Another way of seeing this transition is to examine the increase in home size at 
the time of purchase among new and repeat buyers. This is shown in Table 2. New buyers 
are defined as those who were previously renters in the prior wave of PSID or BHPS so 
that especially at young ages this often will be their first owned home. Repeat buyers 
were previously also homeowners so that this change now reflects changes in the size of 
owner occupied housing. In the US, while the transition from renter to owner involves a 
larger increment in house size, people are also clearly trading up in the early part of the 
life cycle when they purchase their second and subsequent homes. This effect is even 
stronger in the UK—on average first time buyers purchase houses that are bigger 
comparable than their rented house, but bigger movements up the ladder, defined in terms 
of increments to the number of rooms, tend to take place for repeat buyers.  
We view the shape of the ladder as demographically determined as individuals 
marry, form families with children growing, eventually complete their family building 
with the by now older children leaving home to go off on their own. Figures 1a and 1b 
plot the cumulative distribution of individuals who have completed their fertility by age.
4 
The steepness of this cumulative distribution mimics closely the overall shape of the 
housing ladder—a steep incline during the 20s and 30s with a flattening out during the 
40s. In fact, between ages 25 and the late 30s, this cumulative distribution of competed 
fertility is almost linear, with each year of age increasing the fraction that has finished 
childbearing by 5 percentage points. For example, around age 31, half of all American 
individuals have completed their fertility with three out of every four doing so by age 36.   7
The shape, and level, of the profile corresponds extremely closely to that observed in the 
UK over the same ages.  
Children turning 5 years old may be at a critical stage for housing decisions since 
parents may choose places to live with the quality of schools in mind and may want to 
stay longer in the same place. This could be another indicator of reaching the top of the 
housing ladder and arrival in the ‘family home’. With this in mind, Figures 1a and 1b also 
plot the cumulative fraction of individuals who ever had child at least 5 years old. Not 
surprisingly, compared to the cumulative completed fertility, this figure is shifted out to 
the right so that if age 5 is a useful marker, reaching the top of the ladder takes place for 
the median family in the mid to late thirties. Nevertheless, as with the completed family 
size profile, the proportion rises steeply over the life cycle up to age 40 in parallel to the 
sharp rise in the number of rooms demonstrated over the same ages. Finally, Figures 1a 
and 1b also plot the proportion with their own children aged 5 or over currently in the 
household, as a measure of contemporaneous housing needs. Again the similarities 
between US and UK are striking- in both countries after age forty there is a sharp decline 
in young children at home, an indication of an eventual demographic rationale for 
downsizing in later life.  
II House Price Volatility 
Figure 2 shows real indices of country-wide average house prices for the US and 
UK over the period 1974 to 1998 with both series normalized to take a value of one in 
1980. Immediately apparent is the much larger volatility of housing prices in the UK, 
with real prices rising by 50% over the period 1980 to 1989 and then falling back to its   8
previous value by 1992. Over the period as a whole, however, real returns were similar 
across the two countries.  
Although such difference will be instructive when looking at differences in 
housing choices across the two countries, the majority of our testing will rely instead on 
within-country differences in house price volatility in each of the two countries. The UK 
and the US indexes both hide considerable differences across regions with some places 
being much more volatile in housing prices than others. In Figures 3a and 3b we present 
house prices from regional sub indices, grouped to show house price trends in the more 
and less volatile areas.  
The variation across American states in housing price volatility is large. Using the 
standard deviation in real prices (relative to a 1980 base) as the index, Massachusetts 
ranks at the top with price swings between peak and trough over this period of more than 
two to one. At the other extreme lies South Carolina where the peak price exceeds the 
trough by only 15%. The most volatile states are concentrated in New England and along 
the North Eastern seaboard (Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey, Rhode Island, 
Connecticut, New Hampshire, and Maine) and in California and Hawaii. While we will 
use a continuous measure of volatility in our analyses below, for descriptive purposes we 
label these the volatile states.  
To exploit regional and time series differences in volatility in house prices we 
construct indices of volatility by computing the standard deviation of the change in the 
log real house price index over the previous five years for each of the 50 US states and 12 
UK regions for which we have house price indices. These indices, which measure percent 
volatility over the sample are plotted in Figures 4a and 4b, grouped by the same two 
‘volatile’ and ‘non-volatile’ areas as before. Two things are important to note. First, the   9
higher levels of volatility in the UK (even in the ‘non-volatile’ regions) are apparent. 
Second, in both countries, it will be the state/regional level volatility index, not an 
average across groups of regions that enters our empirical specifications.    10
III. Housing Choices in the Presence of House Price Risk and the Housing Ladder 
In order to think about how the housing ladder might affect housing demand in the 
presence of house price risk we use the concept of a minimum housing ‘need’ that 
changes with family size. This need can then be thought of as increasing over the life-
cycle as individuals form into couples, have children and reach their maximum family 
size. Central to our empirical modeling is the idea that these increasing housing needs 
over the life-cycle interact with future house price risks to generate an insurance role for 
housing consumption early in life.
5 In this section we discuss the intuition behind this 
idea, before moving on to testing the predictions of such a framework empirically.  
  In a standard model without house price risk housing demand would increase with 
wealth but would also adjust to reflect the minimum necessary level of consumption. In 
such a framework one could write housing demands in each period as a function of 
adjusted lifetime wealth (i.e. the present discounted value of lifetime wealth net of the 
discounted sum of minimum necessary levels of housing over the lifetime
6), the real user 
cost of housing services, and the minimum level of housing needs in that period. Any 
future change in household demographic composition would simply act through its effect 
on adjusted wealth. While the consumption of housing services may involve the purchase 
of a house and an asset accumulation decision, the assumption of perfect credit markets 
and certainty would yield this aspect of housing consumption unimportant in such a 
setting. We need to generalize this model in order to incorporate house price risk and 
consider the additional role of housing as a durable asset. 
 
   11
For ease of exposition we will assume the life-cycle profile can be represented by 
the following sequence of three discrete life-stages: At stage D = 1 the individual is 
living with his or her parents, at stage D = 2 he or she partners to form an independent 
family unit, and at stage D = 3 the couple has had children and completed its family size.   
This is a simplified demographic profile but represents effectively the upside of the 
housing ‘ladder’ that we wish to capture in our model.
7 For further simplicity we will 
assume that the leaving home decision D=1 → D=2 simply concerns a decision over 
whether to rent or own in the light of the possible increase in family size associated with 
the arrival of children between D=2 and D=3. 
Without price uncertainty the rent/own decision will be driven by transaction 
costs of ownership as well as the desire for mobility, the potential tax advantage of a 
mortgage, and any down payment rules or constraints on the multiples of income that 
may be borrowed.  For a household that expects to remain in their house for a reasonable 
length of time, for example at D=3 (the top stage of the demographic ladder) owning is 
the most efficient way of achieving a desired level (and type) of housing service – with 
idiosyncratic tastes a renter can never commit to stay long enough to make it in the 
landlord’s interest invest in the renter’s idiosyncratic tastes. Hence we will assume for 
simplicity that all households will be owner-occupiers at D=3 and that this is known to 
them at D=2.
8 
Before turning to the introduction of house price risk, there are two aspects of the 
supply of housing services, which are relevant to our discussion. First, a more inelastic 
supply will induce a larger sensitivity of house prices to changes in demand and, in 
particular, to fluctuations in incomes of young first-time buyers. The second aspect 
relates to the rental market —imperfections and/or regulation of the private rental market   12
may make it difficult for the young to use rental housing as the step between leaving the 
parental home and acquiring a house. 
  The introduction of house price uncertainty into the model adds an important 
distinction between ownership and renting which will enhance the desire to accumulate 
housing wealth and thus the need to become an owner earlier in the life cycle - house 
price risk generates an incentive to accumulate housing equity at D=2 before the family 
is complete. At first sight this may seem a puzzle since accumulation of a risky asset 
might normally be expected to decrease with the level of price volatility for a household 
with risk-averse preferences. That usual result does not hold because of the vital 
insurance role played by housing in early life in our framework. We argue this intuitively 
below, but to back up this intuition, in Appendix II we simulate the predictions of a 
simple three-period model with constant relative risk aversion preferences that allows us 
to demonstrate more formally the effects on housing consumption profiles of changing 
volatility, the changing steepness of the housing ladder and changing degrees of risk 
aversion 
At D = 2 there are two choices: how much housing to consume, and whether to 
own or to rent. If house prices are variable and uncertain then, given the expected 
increase demand as the household moves up the demographic ladder from D=2 to D=3, 
housing equity will be an important source of insurance against future house price risk. 
Indeed, in the absence of a financial instrument that could insure this house price risk 
(which may well be defined at a very local level), holding housing early in life may be 
the only insurance mechanism. The larger the uncertainty in house prices and the steeper 
the increase in minimum housing needs over the life cycle, the more important is the 
insurance aspect of housing equity.    13
Thus the key mechanism for these effects is the insurance role of housing in 
period 2. If prices turn out to fall or stay the same then ownership will not, ex post, 
dominate renting. Indeed if house prices fall there will be some loss to ownership. 
However, because of the strongly declining marginal utility of consumption associated 
with housing consumption in period 3 approaching the minimum necessary requirement, 
insuring the risk of house price rises is more important than avoiding the risk of a house 
price fall. To achieve this, the consumer needs to hold an asset whose return is correlated 
with (local) housing prices. If such an asset is not available on the financial market the 
insurance can only be achieved by purchasing the asset itself. Consequently, other things 
equal, the higher the level of house price uncertainty the higher the incentive to become 
an owner-occupier. In this context increasing minimum housing requirements or 
increases in risk aversion are acting in a similar way to an increase in volatility. By a 
straightforward extension of these arguments, individuals will also stay away from 
endowment mortgages and refinancing of housing equity for non-housing consumption or 
investment purposes.
9 
In summary, the decision to accumulate housing equity early in the life cycle will 
be an increasing function of house price volatility for risk-averse households who expect 
an increase in family size. In the absence of an equity market in local housing assets, this 
demand for housing equity also enhances the decision to own.
10 
One further extension that needs to be discussed, since we endeavor to control for 
it in the empirical analysis that follows, is geographic mobility. If individuals anticipate 
residing in less volatile areas in period 3 then their demand for insurance is reduced (and 
the insurance value of their housing equity in period 2 will be reduced also to the extent 
that house prices are not perfectly correlated across regions). It is expected volatility at   14
D=3 (from the point of view of D=2) that drives the insurance motive. In the case of 
individuals in D=2 anticipating moving to a ‘safe’ area at D=3, both these factors are 
likely to play a reduced role, although they could still be important to some extent. 
 
IV. The Empirical Relationship between Housing Choices and Risk 
On the basis of our discussions in the previous section, and the numerical model solutions 
presented in Appendix II, there are three principal predictions that we will test 
empirically in this paper: (1) other things being equal, individuals should buy homes 
earlier in more volatile areas; (2) young homeowners are less likely to consume capital 
gains on housing through refinancing in more volatile areas; and (3) young homeowners 
will consume ‘more’ housing in more volatile areas than their counterparts in less volatile 
areas. In the following subsections we deal with each of the above predictions in turn. 
IV.A. Age of Home Ownership 
In the presence of a housing ladder, individuals living in places with more volatile 
housing prices need to self-insure by buying their first home at a younger age. In the final 
column of Table 3, we list for both the UK and US the proportion of individuals who are 
homeowners, by age for a typical year—1994. These patterns do not depend critically on 
the year chosen. The data are also presented separately for the volatile and non-volatile 
areas in both countries. While average rates of home ownership are similar, there are 
striking differences by age between the two countries. Home ownership rates amongst 
young households are far higher in the UK than in the US, with differences of 10 
percentage points for householders between ages 20-29 and 13 percentage points those 
between ages 30-39. However, through middle age, homeownership rates converge so 
quickly that US rates actually exceed those in the UK among older households.    15
Since prices are far more variable in the UK, these cross-country differences in 
home ownership rates are consistent with our theoretical implication that ownership 
should occur at a younger age in more price volatile housing markets. However, when we 
compare home ownership rates between the volatile and non-volatile areas within each 
country, the challenge to our theory becomes more apparent. In both countries, owning a 
home is somewhat less common among younger households in the volatile market.  
However, there are other significant differences between these two markets in 
each country that will presumably strongly affect the decision to own. Tables 4a and 4b 
lists some of the more salient ones. Perhaps, most important, housing prices are much 
higher in the volatile markets. For example, the average price of a home in the more 
volatile states is almost twice that in the less volatile ones, which should certainly 
discourage home ownership among the young. While rental prices are also higher in the 
more volatile states, the percentage difference is 46% compared to 68% for housing 
prices. Young individuals living in the volatile states also have more education, 
household income, and are less likely to be married and to have children. All of these 
factors are obviously relevant to the housing tenure decision so the final verdict on the 
theory requires multivariate modeling. 
In our multivariate analysis, we estimate a probit model of whether or not one is a 
homeowner using a sample of individuals who are between the ages of 21 and 35. Results 
are similar if one uses a somewhat younger or somewhat older age band that corresponds 
to the rising part of the housing ladder. In addition to our measure of housing price 
volatility described above, this model includes several relevant demographic attributes—
a quadratic in age, indicator variables for whether one is married and whether one has 
children, the log income of the tax unit in which the individual participates, and measures   16
capturing years of schooling. We measure area and age specific housing prices by using 
the PSID and BHPS to compute mean housing prices and mean rents in each state/region 
for owners and renters respectively, within broad age groups. These prices as well as 
benefit unit income are entered in logs. 
The critical variable for testing our theory concerns housing price variability, 
which varies across space and time. We construct a five-year moving window of the 
standard deviation  of the year-to- year differences in the log real housing prices in a 
region
11 as described in the previous section. Since our US housing price series starts in 
1974, this means that our PSID analysis starts with the 1980 PSID and extends to the 
1997 PSID. Since fewer historical years are available in the BHPS, the analysis there 
covers the years 1991-2003.  
As noted earlier, expected capital gains are likely to be an important component 
of the demand for a risky asset like housing. Expected capital gains reduce the user cost, 
reflecting the risk-return trade-off. To construct an expected gains variable we use the 
change in the regionally varying log real house price index over the previous five years. 
Precisely the same five-year moving window for house prices we use in constructing the 
house price risk variable. 
To control for the possibility that the variability in housing prices across regions 
and states may simply be capturing unmeasured differences across states and regions, we 
estimated all models with and without state and region effects.  A linear time trend is 
added to our models so our time series variation is relative to a common linear trend.  
The results are displayed in Tables 5a and 5b, which lists marginal effects and 
standard errors of all variables obtained from probit models. In both countries, we find 
positive income effects (slightly higher in the UK) and education effects (a possible   17
proxy for permanent income) on home-ownership. Not surprisingly, marriage in both 
countries encourages home ownership and at least in the US children do likewise.  In the 
US and the UK, we also have statistically significant negative price level effects on the 
probability of owning a home. We also find a positive impact of expected capital gains, 
although this is not uniformly significant across all model specifications.  
In both countries, high area-specific rents also discourage home ownership. While 
this may at first blush seem counter-intuitive, it is important to remember that there are 
three options open to young persons in terms of their housing choices—owner, renter, or 
living with others—especially parents. When we estimated models for whether one was a 
renter, higher rental prices discouraged both renting and home owning.  
The coefficients on the price volatility variables form the basis of the test of our 
central prediction. In both the US and UK, we estimate statistically significant positive 
effects of price volatility indicating that as predicted individuals choose to own homes at 
a younger age in the more housing price volatile areas. When state/region dummy 
variables are included, these estimated effects are remarkably similar in the two countries 
so that on the margin Britons appear to react more only because volatility on average is 
so much higher there.  
IV.B. The Decision to Refinance 
As discussed above, our key hypothesis is that households in areas where housing prices 
are volatile should self-insure at young ages by holding more housing. However, if they 
were to buy a house and then refinance and use the proceeds to finance consumption or to 
purchase risky assets this would simply undo the safety housing provides. As such, we 
would expect less of such behavior in volatile areas and we test this prediction in this   18
section. Although imperfect, our two datasets provide some measure of the extent to 
which individuals engage in such activities. With regard to the US, PSID data contain no 
direct questions in each year on refinancing, so we define an indicator of refinancing to 
take the value 1 if an individual’s mortgage is observed to have risen by a specified 
amount between waves.
12 The problem with this measure is that individuals could well be 
using the extra finance to improve their home, which would not unravel the housing as 
price insurance mechanism, thus making it an imperfect measure for our purposes.  
This prediction can, however, be directly addressed in the UK using BHPS data, 
where individuals are asked specific questions about whether they refinanced their 
housing equity between waves, and if so whether the purposes for which the resulting 
money was used. With such detailed questions we are able to construct a more precise 
indicator in the UK that takes the value 1 only if individuals refinance between waves and 
do not increase the quantity or quality of housing as a result.  
Our results are summarized in Tables 6a and 6b. In addition to the non-price 
variables that were part of the home ownership model, we included a measure of home 
equity in the previous year to capture the amount available for refinancing. In both 
countries, using both measures of refinancing, the predictions of the theory are borne 
out—individuals in more risky areas are less likely to refinance, conditional on other 
characteristics and their initial level of net housing equity.  
IV.C. Increased Consumption of Housing 
As pointed out in Section 2, one can insure against future housing price volatility in 
period D=3 not only by purchasing a house in period D=2 but also by consuming more 
owned housing than one might otherwise want given the objective demographic   19
circumstances.  Moreover, in the presence of borrowing constraints there is a possibility 
that, if prices rise more quickly than income, debt to income restrictions may prevent 
individuals being able to purchase a larger home at D=3. With this possibility on the 
horizon individuals, already more likely to be an owner-occupier as a result of the 
increased volatility, would also choose to increase their consumption of housing, since in 
the case of prices rising the capital gain will be higher and can be used as down payment 
on the final home in order to offset the debt to income restriction. Indeed, in the UK, the 
two conditions are often linked (since on a secured loan the consequences of default to 
the lender are reduced with a higher down payment) such that individuals with higher 
down payments can borrow a higher multiple of income. 
In order to measure the consumption of housing, for the purposes of testing this 
prediction we use two variables—the number of rooms in the house, and the gross value 
of the house.
13 Neither is perfect since the former omits possible quality effects and the 
latter may be contaminated by unmeasured price variation leading to uncontrolled for 
demand effects. Nevertheless, each provides a useful complementary test for the 
predictions of the model. For each of these measures of housing consumption, we use a 
standard Heckman type selectivity model to evaluate the predictions for home-owners 
only, using the probits reported in Tables 5a and 5b as the selection equations and 
omitting the rental price from the continuous part of the model. 
  Tables 7a and 7b report the results of estimating selection models for the number 
of rooms occupied by young homeowners.  These estimates show significant positive 
effects of volatility on house size but only in the UK —young British home owners in 
risky areas tend to consume more rooms than their counterparts in safer areas in order to   20
partially insure themselves against housing price risk. The effects are positive in the US 
as well but not statistically significant at conventional test levels. 
  Other estimated parameters accord with a priori intuition. The number of rooms 
increases with income, education, whether an individual is married, and with the presence 
of children, and decreases with the average price of housing per room in the area. The 
magnitude of the demographic effects (marriage and children) and the income effects are 
similar in the two countries. Finally, those individuals moving from risky to safe areas 
have a  reduced number of rooms, as would be predicted by their insurance motive being 
reduced, although not by enough to offset the volatility effect altogether.  
  In Tables 8a and 8b we repeat this analysis using gross house value as our 
measure of housing consumption. Again in both countries, as predicted by our theory 
individuals in risky areas choose to have higher housing wealth than those living in safe 
areas. This effect is reduced for those observed to move from risky to safe areas during 
the period of our data. Thus, those individuals who end up moving out of the risky 
housing price areas appear to insure less in the sense that they do not over consume 
housing when they are young. Once again, the principal demographic variables enter with 
the expected signs and in about the same magnitude in both countries- home values 
increase with marriage, children, and age (at least until middle age).  Similarly, income 
and education effects are positive in both countries although our estimated current 
income elastic city is much higher in the US than in the UK.   
  The models estimated in Tables 7 and 8 are based on two alternative and 
imperfect measures of housing consumption.  However, the general similarity of the 
estimated models across both specifications, and in particular the similar estimated   21
effects of our measure housing price variability on housing consumption in both countries 
lends support to the predictions of our model.   
IV.D Endowment Mortgages  
Over the period covered by our data, one relatively common financial instrument used to 
finance house purchases in Britain was an endowment mortgage. During the life of the 
mortgage, the borrower makes only interest payments on the loan, leaving the principal to 
be repaid at the end of the term of the mortgage. In addition to the interest, the borrower 
pays into a saving scheme, which is designed to mature and repay at least the value of the 
capital sum borrowed at the end of the period of the loan. Throughout the 1980s and 
1990s these schemes were common, with the most common type of saving scheme being 
an endowment policy that is an investment product—essentially term life insurance with 
the fund invested in the stock market.  
  Because of the risky nature of this product, our framework would predict that 
households who live in volatile areas should be less likely to choose this type of 
mortgage.
14 These predictions are borne out using the same framework as the tests 
presented above.  In Table 9, we report results obtained from probit models with the 
dependent variable being whether individuals finance their house purchase with an 
endowment mortgage. Since mortgage arrangements typically do not change over the 
term of the mortgage (and in the case of endowment policies the penalties for early 
termination are high), we are able to use homeowners of all ages for this test, thus also 
implicitly increasing the period over which are effects are apparent.  Whether or not we 
include region dummies, British families who live in more volatile housing price areas   22
are less likely to take out an endowment mortgage. This estimated effect is statistically 
significant.  
V. Conclusions 
Typically, risk-averse individuals will avoid risky assets as volatility increases. In this 
paper we show that owner-occupied housing is an exception to this rule. The 
consumption role of housing wealth, coupled with increasing necessary levels of housing 
over the life cycle due to demographic changes, and the fact that individuals will typically 
prefer to own rather than rent, mean that individuals will expect to be consuming a risky 
commodity—owner occupied housing—in middle age. Since housing is a necessity the 
utility consequences of this risk might be expected to be relatively large. In the absence 
of suitable financial products to insure this risk, this will lead individuals to invest in 
housing early in the life cycle as a way of insuring future price fluctuations. Not only 
does this lead to higher owner-occupation rates, it also leads to more housing wealth and 
less propensity to realize capital gains on housing through refinancing to fund non-
housing consumption. 
Using micro data from two countries we have constructed tests of these 
predictions and all are borne out empirically. Cross-country differences between the US 
and UK correspond to the cross-country differences in volatility—the UK is more volatile 
and UK households own earlier, and have more of their portfolio in housing. Because this 
may be driven by other differences between countries, we use within country tests that 
rely on time-series and cross-sectional variation in volatility within and across states (in 
the US) or regions (in the UK) we continue to find empirical support for the predictions 
of the theory.    23
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Endnotes 
 
                                                 
1 A detailed data description is provided in Appendix I 
2 In the UK there is little evidence of cohort effects during the early part of the adult life cycle for the 
period 1968 -1998 (Banks, Blundell and Smith, 2003). This suggests the rise would be the same whether 
we look at individual date of birth cohorts or pool across cohorts as in the tables here. In the US, there is 
some evidence of the number of rooms plateauing out at higher values among more recent cohorts. 
3 The profiles in Table 1 show some evidence of ‘downsizing’ at older ages as children move out and the 
parents transit into retirement. While this downsizing may be important especially for retired American 
households (see Venti and Wise , 2001), it is not the focus of this paper, which concentrates instead on the 
implications of the steps up the ladder earlier in life and a full analysis would need to take into account the 
possible effects of cohort differences amongst older those at older ages on these profiles. 
4 Completed family size is computed by taking individuals aged 50 or over and assuming they will not have 
any more children. We then look back through their fertility history and find the age at which their final 
child was born, and call this age the age of completed family size. 
5 In a related framework, Francois Ortalo-Magne and Sven Rady (2002) have looked at the theoretical 
predictions of an equilibrium model of home-ownership when house prices are volatile. 
6 This wealth variable contains the current value of assets and the future stream of discounted income 
flows. Housing equity and other assets will be added in our discussion of uncertainty below. 
7 We ignore here older stages of the life cycle where the possibility of downsizing comes into play (see 
Stephen Venti and David Wise (2001) and Lousie Sheiner and David Weil (1992) for example). 
8 To the extent that this probability is less than one then any insurance motive will be dampened but as long 
as the positive probability of homeownership at D=3 is not zero the insurance motive will still exist. Since 
our empirical tests are simply for the presence of an insurance effect of house price risk on housing choices 
at D=2 all they formally require is that this probability is not zero.  
9 Borrowing constraints add further refinements to the model. They typically take two forms: a down 
payment constraint and a multiple income (or debt to income) constraint. The down payment is 
proportional to the house price. The multiple income constraint restricts the mortgage to be a multiple of   27
                                                                                                                                                   
current income. With such constraints in place, the potential downside of a house price rise between D=2 
and D=3 for a non-owner enhances the insurance value of ownership at D=2. If house prices rise relative to 
incomes then the capital gain reduces the mortgage requirement and makes it more likely that the earnings 
to mortgage debt can be met. Such borrowing constraints add to the insurance value of ownership since an 
unexpected price increase at D=3 considerably relieves the down payment constraint. 
10 An additional reason for ownership is given by rental price risk. As Sinai and Souleles (2005) point out, 
house ownership insures housing consumption from rental price risk (although it may not alleviate cyclical 
fluctuations in housing costs when variable rate mortgages are the predominant form of finance for housing 
purchases). Our focus here is specifically on the housing ladder where we show house price risk enhances 
the probability of ownership and the speed with which an individual moves up the ladder. At this stage of 
the life-cycle where expected duration of stay in rental housing is relatively short, rental price risk may be 
less relevant than for lifetime renters. In addition, young agents can avoid rental price risk by living with 
their parents until they are ready to buy a home. This is relatively common pathway in Britain. 
11 For each of the 50 US states and the 12 UK regions. 
12 In practice, small rises could simply be a result of measurement error, so we choose a variety of 
thresholds above which we assert a change in mortgage can be interpreted as a refinance. The specification 
in Table 6a uses a definition of mortgage rising by at least 30% or $5000, whichever is the greater. 
13 With increasing availability of appropriate panel data on wealth, there has been renewed interest in the 
study of housing wealth dynamics and its implications for other economic factors. Flavin and Yamshita 
(2002) look at the effect on household’s optimal financial asset holding of integrating housing (i.e. both 
housing wealth and the associated consumption demand for housing services) into the portfolio model. In a 
more empirical study, Banks, Blundell and Smith (2003) show that housing wealth differentials between 
the US and the UK offset to some extent the differences in financial wealth observed between the two 
countries. But in spite of recognition of the dual importance of housing as both consumption and 
investment, the implications of the often-considerable housing price uncertainty for the life-cycle path of 
housing wealth are not well understood. 
14 One complication in testing this prediction is that particularly in the 1980’s (and early 1990’s), there is 
some evidence that mis-selling of this type of mortgage took place by mortgage providers. In particular,   28
                                                                                                                                                   
there is the possibility that consumers were not fully informed of the nature of other choices of mortgage 
arrangements available or about the risky nature of the endowment policy. Assuming such effects were 
constant across regions, however, we might still expect those living in more volatile regions to be less 
likely to take out such mortgages. 
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Appendix I: Data Sources 
The PSID started in 1968 collecting information on a sample of roughly 5,000 (original) 
families. Of these, about 3,000 were representative of the US population as a whole (the 
core sample), and about 2,000 were low-income families (the Census Bureau's Survey of 
Economic Opportunities sample). Thereafter, both the original families and their split-
offs (children of the original family forming a family of their own) have been followed 
giving a total of around 35,000 individuals. Panel members were interviewed each year 
until 1997 when a two-year periodicity rule was established. All original members of the 
1968 households and their progeny are considered sample members and thus are part of 
the panel even if they move out of the original household.  The US models presented in 
this paper include the SEO over sample although they were also estimated using only the 
core sample and our results regarding the effects of housing price volatility were not 
affected. 
In each wave of the panel, the PSID asks detailed questions on individual and 
household income, family size and composition, schooling, education, age, and marital 
status. State of residence is available yearly and individuals are followed to new locations 
if they move. Unlike many other prominent American wealth surveys, the PSID is 
representative of the complete age distribution. Yearly housing tenure questions 
determine whether individuals currently own, rent or live with others. Questions on 
housing ownership, value, and mortgage were asked in each calendar year wave of the 
PSID.
1 Renters are asked the amount of rent they pay and both owners and renters are 
asked the total number of rooms in the residence. 
                                                 
1 Mortgages are not available in the PSID for years 1973, 1974, 1975, and 1982.    30
In addition to the PSID, housing price data were obtained from the Office of 
Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) House Price Index. These data contain 
quarterly and yearly price indexes for the value of single-family homes in the US in the 
individual states and the District of Columbia.
2 These data use repeat transactions for the 
same houses to obtain a quality constant index and is available for all years starting in 
1974. All yearly housing prices by state are reported relative to those that prevailed in 
1980. By 1995 there were almost 7 million repeat transactions in the data so that the 
number of observations for each state is reasonably large. No demographic data are 
available with this index. 
For the UK, we use the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS). The BHPS has 
been running annually since 1991 and, like the PSID, is also representative of the 
complete age distribution. The wave 1 sample consisted of some 5,500 households and 
10,300 individuals, and continuing representativeness of the survey is maintained by 
following panel members wherever they move in the UK and also by including in the 
panel the new members of households formed by original panel members. The BHPS 
contains annual information on individual and household income and employment as well 
as a complete set of demographic variables. Like the PSID, data are collected annually on 
primary housing wealth, and on secondary housing wealth.
3  
In addition to the BHPS, regional house price data were obtained from the 
Nationwide Building Society House Price series, which is a quarterly regional house 
price series going back to 1974. Rather than use a repeat sales index, the prices are 
                                                 
2 For details on this data see Charles Calhoun (1996). The paper is available on the OFHEO website.  
3 Housing wealth and mortgages are not available in 1992.   31
adjusted for changes in the mix of sales to approximate a composition constant index, and 
are also seasonally adjusted. 
Throughout the paper we take care to define the unit of analysis as the benefit unit 
(i.e., singles or couples with dependent children) such that young individuals at the 
beginning of the life-cycle living in shared accommodation or with other family members 
are not lost from the analysis as subsidiary adults in households headed by other 
individuals. This is particularly important for older independent children who are still 
residing with parents and who would show up in middle-aged households in a 
conventional head of household based analysis. In both countries, housing wealth is 
allocated to the home owning benefit unit only. Hence a 25-year-old living with their 
parents in an owned property is not defined as an owner (unless they own the property 
jointly with their parents) and is assigned zero housing wealth.  
We use several housing wealth concepts in this paper. The current value of the 
house is derived in both the PSID and BHPS by asking respondents to report the current 
market value of their home while housing equity is constructed by subtracting from the 
current house value the outstanding mortgage.   32
Appendix II: Numerical simulation of a simple model of ownership and housing equity in 
the presence of house price risk and a housing ladder 
The integration of housing price risk into a single theoretical framework is 
complex and even algebraic closed form solutions will only be possible under certain 
(restrictive) forms of preferences.  Ideally, however, we want to use relatively flexible 
preferences for consumption and housing to generate predictions relating to the effects of 
house price risk. In this appendix we use numerical methods in order to offer insight into 
the predictions of the model using a very simple set of specifications for preferences, the 
steepness of the housing ladder, and the time-series process for the underlying 
uncertainty.
4  
For the purpose of our simulations, we assume that individuals maximize 
expected discounted life-time utility, with the utility functions for an individual in each of 
the decision periods being given by: 
(1)   
where  t q  is the consumption of housing services in period t and all other consumption is 
summarized by  t c . To accord with our discussions of section III, these preferences are 
characterized by having a necessary level of housing consumption,  t q , in each period to 
capture the housing ladder; but they also take the CRRA form to allow us to look at the 
impact of varying risk aversion on the predictions of the model. 
                                                 
4 Ultimately, many other extensions could be looked at with this approach, such as the sensitivity of 
predictions to rental premia, the cost of mortgage borrowing, the extension of the model to a greater 
number of time periods or the differences in predictions that emerge as we allow income uncertainty (with 
differing degrees of correlation between income and house price shocks). But we leave these extensions for 
further work since, at this stage, we want to make the model as simple as possible whilst still remaining 
sufficiently general to examine the specific predictions on which the empirical analyses in this paper are 
based.   33
We solve the numerical model with three periods, aimed at capturing the phases 
of the life cycle discussed in Section III, rather than calendar years, quarters or even 
months. When building a numerical solution algorithm, the choice of units and parameter 
values forces one to think carefully about the relative length of periods. In taking 
numerical methods to our model we essentially need to think of periods of unequal 
length, in order to capture the sense in which period 2 (the middle rung on the housing 
ladder) is a transition to a more permanent state of completed family size and a 
‘permanent’ family home.  A convenient way in which to do this is to introduce factors δ2 
and δ3 , with 0 < δt ≤ 1, t =2,3 and δ2 ≤ δ3 , which describe the flow of consumption 
services qt  from housing stock Ht , so that qt = δtHt.  
We choose a stylised model in which the only uncertainty is in house prices. In 
accordance with our earlier discussions, we assume that in period 1 everyone is a renter 
and in period 3 everyone is an owner. The key decision is whether to own in period 2 or 
wait until period 3. We show that increasing house price uncertainty increases the pay-off 
to ownership in the second period. This pay-off is larger the larger the degree of risk 
aversion and the stronger the gradient in the housing ladder. As we are only interested in 
the relative pay-off of ownership we normalise on first period utility and examine relative 
pay-off in periods 2 and 3. The budget constraint for periods 2 and 3 under each option is 
given by:  
(2a) [Owner at t=2]:    ( ) 23 3222 32 2 23 3 3 yy pp HccpHp H δδ ++ − =++ +  
(2b) [Renter at t=2]:  232 3 2 2 23 3 3 yycc pHp H τ δδ +=++ +   
depending on which tenure is chosen, where yt are discounted incomes, pt are discounted 
prices, ct are discounted consumptions,  and τ  is the rental premium.    34
Implicit in this set up is that an individual can borrow or save at the same (safe) 
rate of interest equal to the discount rate. Finally, we introduce house price uncertainty in 
period 3 by allowing p3 to take the value p2(1+π) with probability ½ and p2(1-π) with 
probability ½. We can then vary the variance of housing price uncertainty by solving the 
model for different values of π.
5 
We solve the model by backward induction with a relatively straightforward 
numerical method that involves a discrete grid search across all possible paths for 
housing consumption in each period, q, consumption in each period, c, and the 
owner/renter decision in period 2. For the purposes of the solution, baseline values are set 
at:, τ = 1, α = 0.3, δ2 = .5, δ3 = 1,  2 0 q =  y3 = 200 and y 2 = .5y3.  The later equality 
equates the flow of income across the two periods given the choice of δ2 and δ3. The 
model is then solved under varying degrees of uncertainty for various values of the 
necessary level of housing in period 3 (which we shall refer to as D) ranging from D=10 
to D=40, and for various values of the risk aversion parameter, γ. 
Figure A1.a shows the difference between the expected utility of renting and 
owning in period 2, expressed as a fraction of the utility of renting, as the variance of 
housing prices increases and as the minimum level of housing required in period 3, i.e. 
the steepness of the housing ladder, increases.  The figure shows that increases in the 
minimum level of housing demand in period 3 result in an increase in the relative utility 
of owning in period 2 for all positive levels of volatility.  Similarly, for all levels of the 
minimum housing requirement in period 3, increasing price volatility results in a stronger 
preference for owning: Increasing house price risk reduces expected utility for both 
                                                 
5 In this discussion we abstract from expected capital gains. However, our empirical model will allow for a 
capital gains term which will reflect the risk-return trade off. Holding the riskless return constant, an 
expected capital gain will reduce the user cost of housing and make ownership more attractive.   35
renters or owners in period 2 but the impact is stronger on the rental option. Consequently 
there is a gain in expected utility terms from ownership in period 2 and this gain increases 
with risk. Figure A1.b presents a complementary analysis but where we hold the housing 
ladder constant and vary the degree of risk aversion in preferences. As risk aversion 
increases the slopes of the profiles with respect to volatility steepen. 
In addition to the home ownership predictions the model should also have 
predictions for the quantity of housing consumed as discussed in section III. Figures A2.a 
and A2.b show the predictions for housing consumption in period 2 as the housing ladder 
steepens and as risk aversion increases. Figure A2.a shows that, for any level of the 
minimum housing requirement in period 3, as volatility increases the quantity of housing 
demanded in period 2 increases — individuals buy more insurance as risk accumulates.
6  
If volatility is significant, a steeper housing ladder results in more housing consumption 
in period 2. This implies that not only will individuals be more likely to purchase a house 
in period 2, they will also be more likely to purchase a ‘bigger’ house. Note that for the 
very lowest value of the minimum housing requirement (D=10) the quantity of housing 
actually declines with volatility. At such a low value of the minimum (and given the 
relative preference for housing implied by our choice of α of 0.3) the housing ladder 
constraint is not effectively binding and therefore the predictions of the model are in 
accordance with the standard case: individuals choose less of a risky activity. 
Figure A2.b presents similar results by risk aversion coefficient. Once again, as 
risk aversion increases, the quantity demanded of housing in the second period increases.  
                                                 
6 Varying the minimum housing requirement and keeping life-time resources constant also generates a 
wealth effect. This is not important for our empirical tests since we will be examining demand for housing 
as volatility varies for a given steepness of the housing ladder. As a result we abstract from this wealth 
effect in this figure by normalizing the housing demand to its zero-volatility value in the two figures.     36
While not shown in these graphs, our model also has implications for non-housing 
consumption in period 2, which is generally declining in housing price volatility.  
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Table 1. The Number of Rooms by age of head of household 
  Age of head of household 
  < 25  25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+  All
US          
Owners and Renters  3.89  4.97 5.99 6.40 6.16 5.34  5.61
Owners Only  5.22  6.16 6.82 6.89 6.56 5.99  6.48
UK    
Owners and Renters  3.04  3.69 4.45 4.98 4.89 4.07  4.40
Owners Only  4.36  3.92 4.69 5.24 5.17 4.54  4.78




Table 2. Changes in rooms for movers, by type of buyer 
  Age of head of benefit unit 
  < 25  25-34  35-44  45-54  55-64  65+  All 
US   
First Time Buyers - Before  3.86 4.66 4.95 4.87 4.99 4.01  4.70
 First Time Buyers - After  5.51 6.61 6.24 5.91 5.72 4.63  5.98
First Time - Difference  1.62 1.45 1.28 1.05 0.71 0.61  1.27
Repeat Buyers - Before  4.84 5.91 6.56 6.87 6.56 5.92  6.32
Repeat Buyers - After  5.49 6.72 7.27 6.94 5.99 5.48  6.66
Repeat - Difference  0.65 0.81 0.71 0.07 -0.57 -0.43  0.30
UK         
First Time Buyers - Before  - 3.31 3.83 4.25 4.13 3.98  3.79
First Time Buyers - After  - 3.83 4.43 4.95 4.49 3.97  4.29
First Time - Difference  - 0.52 0.60 0.70 0.36 -0.01  0.50
Repeat Buyers - Before  - 3.63 4.38 4.98 5.23 4.98  4.59
Repeat Buyers - After  - 4.54 5.26 5.45 4.99 4.05  4.99
Repeat – Difference  - 0.91 0.88 0.47 -0.24 -0.93  0.40
Note: pooled PSID and BHPS data from 1990-1999 and 1991-2003 respectively. First time 
buyers restricted to those previously living in rented accommodation. Cell sizes too small in UK 
for age < 25. 
 
   38
 
Table 3. Proportion of individuals who are homeowners in 1994 
 
Age   ‘Volatile’  Non-volatile All
  
UK   
20-29  0.336  0.397 0.357
30-39  0.717  0.755 0.731
40-49  0.799  0.784 0.794
50-59  0.801  0.723 0.775
60-69  0.754  0.667 0.723
70+  0.602  0.547 0.583
      
All   0.652  0.641 0.648
   
US  
20-29  0.187  0.273 0.253
30-39  0.528  0.612 0.590
40-49  0.691  0.748 0.736
50-59  0.825 
 
0.830 0.828
60-69  0.784  0.875 0.850
70+  0.683  0.723 0.714
  
All   0.583  0.649 0.633
          Data are from the 1994 BHPS and PSID. 
 
   39
Table 4a. Differences across broad regions, 21-35 year olds, US 
 
 Non-volatile  Volatile 
 
Fraction of population (1999)  0.78  0.22 
Owns home  0.43  0.33 
Rents 0.37  0.44 
Ever had a child  0.58  0.47 
Years of education  13.04  13.58 
Log income in 1995$  9.90  10.07 
Mean PSID house value  83,777  155,989 
Mean PSID annual rent  4,116  6,025 
 
 
Table 4b. Differences across broad regions, 21-35 year olds, UK  
 Non-volatile  Volatile 
  
Fraction of population  (2000)  0.34  0.66
Owns home  0.53  0.50
Rents 0.24  0.27
Has a child  0.45  0.50
Education – low  0.48  0.48
Education – medium  0.24  0.25
Education – high  0.28  0.28
Ln income (in £ 2000)  9.50  9.55
Mean BHPS house value (£)  80,455  103,405
Mean BHPS weekly rent (£)  64.00  85.70
    
Source- PSID and BHPS. 
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Table 5 a. Probability of Home-Ownership, US 
  (1)  (2) 
  dF/ dx  Std. Err dF/ dx  Std. Err 
Price Volatility 
Index  0.1874  0.0944 0.4061 0.1084
Age  0.0448  0.0061 0.0478 0.0061
Age Squared  -0.0004  0.0001 -0.0047 0.0001
Married  0.2727  0.0047 0.2698 0.0045
Ever have a child  0.0628  0.0039 0.0671 0.0039
Education  0.0105  0.0009 0.0104 0.0009
Ln Income  0.2057  0.0026 0.2070 0.0026
Ln Housing Prices  -0.0559  0.0051 -0.0366 0.0069
Exp. Capital Gains  0.0360 0.0538 0.1069 0.0554
Ln Rental prices  -0.0476  0.0057 0.0151 0.0069
Move A-B  -0.1513  0.0155 -0.1139 0.0157
Move B-A  -0.1114  0.0153 -0.1341 0.0174
Trend  0.0022 0.0004 0.0009 0.0004
State Dummies  No  Yes
 Ages 21-35.  Models also control for city size, missing values, trend and 
number of waves. 
 
Table 5b. Probability of Home-ownership, UK 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
  dF/ dx  Std. Err dF/ dx Std. Err  dF/ dx  Std. Err 
Price Volatility  0.4483 0.1196 0.3361 0.1212 0.3629 0.1226
Age  0.0939 0.0123 0.1107 0.0127 0.1093 0.0127
Age Squared  -0.0011 0.0002 -0.0014 0.0002 -0.0014 0.0002
Married  0.4634 0.0065 0.4623 0.0065 0.4623 0.0065
Has children  0.0347 0.0089 0.0349 0.0089 0.0352 0.0089
Educ - low  -0.0880 0.0086 -0.0874 0.0086 -0.0866 0.0087
Educ - medium  0.0062 0.0097 0.0066 0.0097 0.0070 0.0097
Ln Income  0.2978 0.0061 0.2992 0.0061 0.2989 0.0061
Ln House Prices  -0.2019 0.0128 -0.1084 0.0203 -0.1080 0.0222
Exp. Capital Gains  0.4022 0.0835 0.1648 0.0928 0.1595 0.0968
Ln Rental Prices   -0.1025 0.0174 -0.0963 0.0186
Move A-B  -0.0866 0.0301 -0.0808 0.0302 -0.0802 0.0302
Move B-A  -0.1479 0.0281 -0.1558 0.0279 -0.1559 0.0280
Regional dummies  No   No    Yes    
  Ages 21-35. Models include controls for living in a big city, number of waves observed in panel, 
and trend. 
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Table 6a. Probability of Refinancing a US Home 
  (1)  (2) 
  dF/ dx  Std. Err  dF/ dx  Std. Err 
Price Volatility Index  -0. 5043  0. 1224 -0. 3206 0. 1472
Age  -0. 0078  0. 0094 -0. 0072 0. 0093
Age Squared  0. 0001  0. 0001 0. 0001 0. 0002
Married  0. 0045  0, 0065 0. 0030 0. 0065
Ever have a child  0.0180  0. 0054 0.0017 0. 0054
Education  -0. 0081  0. 0011 -0. 0079 0. 0011
Ln Income  -0. 0179  0. 0035 -0. 0149 0. 0035
Ln House Equityt-1   0. 3086  0. 0242 0.0038 0. 0022
Move A-B  0. 0059  0. 0346 0.0021 0.0034
Move B-A  -0. 0231  0. 0331. -0. 0179 0. 0323
  
State dummies  No  Yes
 Ages 21-35. Models also city size controls, missing value dummies.  
 
Table 6b. Probability of refinancing a UK home 
  (1)  (2) 
  dF/ dx   Std. Err  dF/ dx  Std. Err
Price Volatility  -0.1385  0.0873 -0.2120  0.0875
Age  0.0069  0.0073 0.0072 0.0071
Age Squared  -0.0001  0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001
Married  0.0073  0.0071 0.0071 0.0070
Has children  0.0122  0.0036 0.0128 0.0036
Educ - low  0.0155  0.0044 0.0146 0.0043
Educ - medium  0.0113  0.0050 0.0111 0.0049
Ln Income  0.0089  0.0032 0.0076 0.0032
Ln equity t-1  0.0073  0.0016 0.0055 0.0017
  
Regional dummies  No   Yes
 
Ages 21-35. Models include controls for living in a big city, number of waves 
observed in panel, trend, tax unit composition change between waves t-1 and t. 
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Table 7a. Number of rooms in US 
  (1)  (2) 
  coeff Std. Err coeff Std. Err
 
Intercept  -23.8112 1.16311 -22.6809 1.2213
Price Volatility Index  0. 2411 0.6962 0.7810 0.7572
Age  0. 3963 0. 0500 0.3630 0.0473
Age Squared  -0, 0041 0. 0008 -0.0037 0. 0008
Married  1. 6957 0. 0772 1.5770 0.0707
Ever have a child  0. 7413 0.0320 0.7600 0.0305
Education  0. 1312 0.0064 0.1237 0.0061
Ln Income  1. 5934 0. 0523 1.5098 0.0493
Ln Housing Prices  -01636 00146. -0.3099 0.1307
Move A-B  -0. 4416. 0. 0452 -0.6720 0.0493
Move B-A  -0. 3288 0. 0506 -0.4967 0. 1434
Mills ratio  2. 8039 0. 1198. 2.6379 0.1100
 
State dummies  No Yes
Ages 21-35. Models also city size controls, trend, missing value dummies, 
number of waves observed in panel. Selection equation is reported in Table 4.1a. 
rental price omitted from rooms equation. 
Table 7b. Number of rooms in the UK 
  (1)  (2) 
  coeff Std. Err coeff Std. Err
Intercept  -7.6760  1.4902 -8.2616  1.6620
Price Volatility  5.5235 0.5611 5.4155 0.5696
Age  0.2742 0.0728 0.2862 0.0735
Age Squared  -0.0021 0.0012 -0.0023 0.0012
Married  2.1851 0.1193 2.1993 0.1212
Has children  0.9388 0.0446 0.9377 0.0450
Educ - low  -0.5797 0.0448 -0.5835 0.0451
Educ - medium  -0.1168 0.0476 -0.1185 0.0480
Ln Income  1.2717 0.0677 1.2862 0.0690
Ln House Price  -1.1801 0.0740 -1.1473 0.0917
Move A-B  -0.3124 0.1679 -0.3228 0.1692
Move B-A  -0.7284 0.1692 -0.7193 0.1713
Mills ratio  2.5369 0.1461 2.5570 0.1486
 
Regional dummies  No Yes
Ages 21-35. Model also includes controls for city, trend, number of waves 
observed in panel. Selection equation is reported in Table 4.1a. rental price omitted 
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Table 8a. Gross housing wealth in the US 
  (1)  (2) 
  Coeff Std. Err Coeff Std. Err 
 
Intercept  -9.7116 1.0887 -10.5366 0.3186 
Price Volatility Index  2.5495 0.3493 1.8225 0.3781 
Age  0.3273  0.0253 0.3053  0.0241 
Age Squared  -0.0044 0.0004 -0.0041 0.0004 
Married  0.8275 0.0393 0.6791 0.0376 
Ever have a child  0.1035 0.0161 0.0894 0.0154 
Education  0.1002 0.0032 0.0956 0.0030 
Ln Income  1.0211 0.0266 0.9199 0.0257 
Ln Housing Prices  0.4011 0.0184 0.3238 0.0247 
Move A-B  -0.4927 0.0702 -0.4133 0.0678 
Move B-A  -0.1526 0.0754 -0.1308 0.0736 
Trend 
Mills ratio  1.3550 0.0612 1.1187 0.0591 
 
State dummies  No Yes
Ages 21-35. Models also city size controls, missing value dummies, number of 
waves observed in panel. Selection equation is reported in Table 4.1a. rental price 
omitted from rooms equation. 
Table 8b. Gross housing wealth in the UK 
  (1)  (2) 
  Coeff Std. Err Coeff Std. Err 
Intercept  -5.3252 0.5358 -5.1074 0.5886
Price Volatility  1.7576 0.2018 1.7320 0.2011
Age  0.1843 0.0262 0.1860 0.0260
Age Squared  -0.0023 0.0004 -0.0023 0.0004
Married  0.8354 0.0439 0.8279 0.0439
Has children  0.2427 0.0160 0.2422 0.0159
Educ - low  -0.2354 0.0162 -0.2379 0.0160
Educ – medium  -0.0465 0.0172 -0.0488 0.0170
Ln Income  0.5670 0.0243 0.5661 0.0243
Ln House Prices  0.5534 0.0267 0.5347 0.0324
Move A-B  -0.0962 0.0605 -0.1023 0.0599
Move B-A  -0.2620 0.0612 -0.2456 0.0609
Mills ratio  0.9095 0.0523 0.9000 0.0523
 
Regional dummies  No Yes
Ages 21-35 only. Models also includes controls for city, trend, number of waves 
observed in panel. Selection equation is reported in Table 4.1a. rental price 
omitted from rooms equation. 
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Table 9. Probability of holding endowment mortgage, home owners in UK only 
  (1)  (2) 
  dF/ dx  Std. Err  dF/ dx Std. Err  
Price Volatility  -4.6663  0.0995 -4.6318  0.1020
Age  0.0199  0.0018 0.0201 0.0018
Age Squared  -0.0003  2.10E-05 -0.0003 2.10E-05
Married  0.0383  0.0089 0.0380 0.0089
Has children  0.0432  0.0066 0.0436 0.0066
Education - low  0.0429  0.0070 0.0438 0.0070
Education - medium  0.0197  0.0081 0.0197 0.0081
Ln Income  0.0081  0.0052 0.0083 0.0053
Move A-B  0.1114  0.0453 0.1134 0.0452
Move B-A  -0.0403  0.0480 -0.0452 0.0479
          
Regional dummies  No    Yes  
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Figure 1a: The demographic ladder, US 
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Figure 2. Comparison of UK and US house prices 
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Figure 3a: US mean house price index by area, 1980-1997 
 
 
Figure 3b: UK mean house price index by area, 1980-2000 
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Figure A1a: Relative utility of owner occupation when young 











































Figure A1b: Relative utility of owner occupation when young 
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Figure A2a: Consumption of housing when young 

































Figure A2b: Consumption of housing when young 
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